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Disputation is a Fighting Sport
In 835, Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (d. 855) was brought before the council of al-Muʿtaṣim 
to debate the createdness of the Quran. Ibn Ḥanbal refused to dispute with his 
Muʿtazili adversaries. For, in his understanding, disputation was a concomitant 
of rational opinion, kalām, and innovation, the most vicious threats he stood 
against. Five centuries later, several biographers of Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyah (d. 
1350), the prominent Hanbali theologian and jurist, inform us that he was an out-
standing debater. 1 With regard to disputation, Ibn al-Qayyim is far from being an 
exception in later Hanbalism. His master Ibn Taymīyah (d. 1328) also engaged in 
famous theological, juridical, and inter-religious debates. As such, the change in 
Hanbalism was not accidental, which raises the question: what happened to Han-
balism prior to the period of the thirteenth–fourteenth centuries that explains 
this shift towards dialectics?
The most probable answer to this question is Ashʿarization. In the eleventh 
century, an Ashʿari-Shafiʿi connivance made kalām and juridical dialectics part of 
the madrasah curriculum and the intellectual life of Baghdad. The Ashʿari impact 
reached prominent Hanbalis such as al-Qāḍī Abū Yaʿlá (d. 1066) and Ibn Aʿqīl (d. 
1119), both of whom left us with rich debate literature in law and theology. Fur-
thermore, the influence of al-Ghazzālī (d. 1111) on Hanbali legal theory is evident, 
as can be seen in the writings of Ibn Qudāmah (d. 1223). 
However, disputation was not taken for granted in Hanbali circles, as scholars 
had to justify it through a scriptural legitimacy. Two major Hanbali authors at-
tempted such an enterprise. First, Nāṣiḥ al-Dīn ibn al-Ḥanbalī (d. 1236) compiled 
and described the Quranic uses of various dialectical procedures in his Kitāb 
Istikhrāj al-jidāl min al-Qurʾān al-Karīm. Later, Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī (d. 1316), in his 
This article builds on a lecture given at the Institut für Islamwissenschaft, Berlin, Germany (Feb-
ruary 6, 2012). I would like to extend my thanks to Prof. Birgit Krawietz for making the event 
possible.
1 Several sources mention his skills in disputation. For example, see Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, Bug-
hyat al-wuʿāh fī ṭabaqāt al-lughawīyīn wa-al-nuḥāh, ed. Muḥammad Abū al-Faḍl Ibrāhīm (Beirut, 
1979), 1:63. Fawzīyah bint Fahd bint ʿAlī al-Masnad attempted a reconstruction of Ibn al-Qayyim’s 
disputation. Her study is normative, apologetic, and incomplete, with useless digressions; see: 
Fawzīyah bint Fahd bint ʿAlī al-Masnad, “Al-Munāẓarah ʿinda Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyah” (M.A. 
thesis, The Islamic University of Imām Muḥammad ibn Saʿūd, 2005).
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Aʿlam al-jadhal fī ʿilm al-jadal, adopted the dialectics of Shafiʿi legal theorists, ap-
plying its procedures to the Quran, the Prophetic tradition, and Arabic literature. 2 
It seems that by the time Ibn Taymīyah started his studies, around 1270, ra-
tionalization was already unavoidable even within the Hanbali school. A major 
book in Muslim dialectics was ascribed to Ibn Taymīyah under the title of Tanbīh 
al-rajul al-ʿāqil ʿalá tamwīh al-jadal al-bāṭil. This book is a refutation of Rukn al-Dīn 
al-ʿAmīdī’s (d. 1218) juridical dialectics. The style and the content of the book sug-
gest a different author, but within the Hanbali circle nonetheless. 3
Hanbali attitudes towards disputation were typically normative; Hanbalis en-
dorsed it with reserve as disputation became an unstoppable rationalist pandemic 
(to use a medical metaphor Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyah cherishes). 4 The challenge for 
Hanbalis was to respond to rationalization without compromising their tradi-
tionalist foundations. Philosophizing theology and juridical dialectics dominated 
the era and the old resistance of Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal could not work anymore. The 
response of Ibn Taymīyah and Ibn al-Qayyim are better understood in a frame-
work that can be defined as a traditionalism evolving toward a more rationalized 
form in order to survive the battle of rationalization. 
Ibn Qayyim compared disputation to a fighting sport. 5 In his Al-Furūsīyah, he 
states that musābaqah and munāḍalah (horse competition and archery) prepare 
competitors for jihād. 6 Since each competitor would like to defeat his adversary, 
he is training hard to overcome him. Likewise, Ibn Qayyim asserts that this is 
exactly the same case for debaters. One would prepare himself for the debate 
through practice. He would make statements, objections, and counter argumen-
tation until he masters the core of the issue at hand so that if a follower of false-
hood, mubṭil, debates him, he would be ready for the challenge.
If disputation is similar to combat, what war of ideas was Ibn al-Qayyim think-
ing of? In his Al-Ṣawāʿiq al-mursalah, he unfolds for us the target of his campaign, 
and by the same token, the key motivation of his project and that of his teacher 
Ibn Taymīyah: 
There was darkness in the orient and the light of prophethood 
and revelation vanished. People gave preference to their intellects, 
2 Wolfhart Heinrichs, “Ğadal bei aṭ-Ṭūfī: Eine Interpretation seiner Beispielsammlung,” Zeitschrift 
der Deutschen Morganländischen Gesellschaft Supplement iii, I (1975): 463–73.
3 George Makdisi, “The Tanbīh of Ibn Taymīya on Dialectic: The Pseudo-ʿAqīlian Kitāb al-Farq,” 
in Medieval and Middle Eastern Studies in Honor of Aziz Suryal Atiya, ed. Sami A. Hanna (Leiden, 
1972), 285–94.
4 I also refer to the Avicennian pandemic in the sense Yahya Michot used it; see “La pandémie 
avicennienne au VIe/XIIe siècle,” Arabica 40 (1993): 287–344. 
5 In a similar manner to P. Bourdieu’s formula “la sociologie est un sport de combat.”
6 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyah, Al-Furūsīyah, ed. Samīr Ḥusayn Ḥalabī (Ṭanṭā, 1991), 39.
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opinions, and politics over revelation. As a result, philosophy and 
logic took primacy. In this time, Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī [d. 1274] was 
the leader of these people. He replaced the Quran with the Ishārāt 
of Avicenna. Al-Ṭūsī claimed that the latter were demonstrative 
statements while the Quran was rhetorical transmissions. He per-
secuted the traditional scholars of Islam. 7
Ibn al-Qayyim considered al-Ṭūsī to be Satan’s follower because both contested 
divine commands, instead preferring their own reason. For Ibn al-Qayyim, as a 
consequence of al-Ṭūsī’s work, three evils appeared: the dialectics of al-ʿAmīdī, 
the monism of Ibn Aʿrabī (d. 1240), and the theological skepticism of Fakhr al-
Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1209). 8 All three figures preceded al-Ṭūsī and if one must assign 
influence, it should be the other way around, especially al-Rāzī’s influence on al-
Ṭūsī. Be that as it may, Ibn al-Qayyim perceived the rationalization of juridical 
dialectics, Sufism, and kalām as a major threat to traditional knowledge. But he 
asserted that “God made Ibn Taymīyah to preserve his religion” 9—i.e., to refute 
the three axes of evil. Ibn al-Qayyim used a martial metaphor to describe Ibn 
Taymīyah’s campaign and that of his own: God established his soldiers to invade 
these kingdoms (of evil), some of them with the sword and others with proof and 
argumentation. 10
Recently, Tzvi Langermann argued that Ibn al-Qayyim’s treatment of rational 
knowledge should be considered as a process of naturalization of science. 11 I dis-
agree with this claim. Ibn al-Qayyim rejects logic and dialectics as inauthentic 
and false forms of knowledge. In his view, traditions bear the perfect example 
of validity and truth as opposed to that of the philosophers and the theologians. 
Ibn al-Qayyim’s traditionalism is different from that of Ibn Ḥanbal, but it is not 
his invention. Traditionalism evolved slowly through centuries accepting, in the 
course of history, certain forms of Sufism, dialectics, and theology that strength-
ened traditionalism. In particular, through the disciplines of legal theory, early 
Sunni kalām, and Quranic exegesis, which reached him as traditionalized knowl-
edge, Ibn al-Qayyim accepted some Ashʿari-Shafiʿi views on disputation and dealt 
with them as part of traditionalism. Based on the evidence of Ibn al-Qayyim’s 
theory and practice of disputation, I believe that he sustains a minimal selection 
7 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyah, Al-Ṣawāʿiq al-mursalah, ed. ʿAlī ibn Muḥammad al-Dakhīl Allāh (Ri-
yadh, 1991), 1077.
8 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyah, Al-Ṣawāʿiq al-mursalah, 1078–79.
9 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyah, Al-Ṣawāʿiq al-mursalah, 1079.
10 Ibid.
11 Tzvi Langermann, “The Naturalization of Science in Ibn Qayyim al-Ğawziyyah’s Kitāb al-Rūḥ,” 
in A Scholar in the Shadow: Essays in the Legal and Theological Thought of Ibn Qayyim al-Ǧawziyyah, 
ed. Caterina Bori and Livnat Holtzman (Rome, 2010), 211–28.
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of traditionalized elements with apologetic purposes, allowing him to condemn 
Ashʿari-Shafiʿi rationalization. Ibn al-Qayyim’s disputation illustrates his battle 
against rationalization as incarnated by later Ashʿari theologians. In several fields 
of science such as astronomy, logic, and medicine, scientific activity grew expo-
nentially in the Mamluk period, becoming widely accepted by Ashʿari theolo-
gians and jurists. 12 Thus, Ibn al-Qayyim’s chief concern was a de-rationalization 
and re-traditionalization of Sunnism. 13
1. Theory
Ibn al-Qayyim’s starting point is a dismissal of dialectics as practiced by later 
theologians and philosophers. He criticizes jadal for its structure, its function, 
and its implications. First, he rejects it for using logic in argumentation. At this 
point, he denies naturalization to logic. The very non-Islamic nature of logic and 
its claim to universal truth through demonstration should suffice as reasons for 
this refusal. Further, he disapproves of jadal’s claim to be a dialectical law, sharīʿah 
jadalīyah, as established by the theologians. 14 What particularly bothers Ibn al-
Qayyim is the possibility that a law (other than the Islamic one) could govern the 
speech and the behavior of individuals and lead to a different conclusion than 
that of truth (established by Islamic law). Procedures of disputation, if they were 
to be accepted, should instead lead to scriptural truth. He admits, however, that 
the dialectical law contains both falsehood and truth, fīhā ḥaqq wa-bāṭil. 15 Finally, 
he dismisses it for its implications such as the negation of attributes, doubt, and 
confusion of people’s faith. Thus, he clearly targets here the theological dialectics 
of later Ashʿari mutakallimūn who used jadal to exclude scriptural proofs (i.e., the 
ones used by traditionists).
As an alternative to dialectics, Ibn al-Qayyim suggests the salaf way of dispu-
tation, ṭarīqat al-salaf fī al-munāẓarah. In his view, the salaf model of disputation 
was unique because it combines scriptural and rational proofs. He wrote a long 
chapter in his Badāʾiʿ  al-fawāʾid which he entitled fuṣūl ʿaẓīmat al-nafʾ jiddan, to 
12 Nahyan A. G. Fancy developed this aspect in Science and religion in Mamluk Egypt: Ibn al-Nafis, 
pulmonary transit and bodily resurrection (London, 2013).
13 Three recent scholarly works considerably upgraded our knowledge and understanding of Ibn 
al-Qayyim’s work: Islamic Theology, Philosophy and Law: Debating Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim 
al-Jawziyya, ed. Birgit Krawietz and Georges Tamer (Berlin, 2013); A Scholar in the Shadow, ed. 
Bori and Holtzman; and Birgit Krawietz, “Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyah: His Life and Works,” Mamlūk 
Studies Review 10 (2006): 19–64.
14 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyah, Badāʾiʿ al-fawāʾid, ed. ʿAlī ibn Muḥammad al-ʿ Umrān (Mecca, 2003), 
1533.
15 Ibid.
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elaborate on this model. 16 The premise of Ibn al-Qayyim is that the Quran and 
Sunnah should guide us to the sound way of disputation: the explanation of legal 
causes, bayān al-ʿ ilal, the distinctions, furūq, and the invalidation of the argument 
by circle, dawr, or by infinite regress, tasalsul. 17 Moreover, Ibn al-Qayyim states 
that the Prophet Muḥammad was the first to formulate answers to objections. 18 
Ibn al-Qayyim refers here to a terminology and argumentation techniques that 
he learned from juridical dialectics and later kalām. In the first step of his reason-
ing, Ibn al-Qayyim reconstructs a straw-man argument in which he depicted a 
general and incomplete model of disputation. 19 In Ibn al-Qayyim’s understand-
ing, this legacy was not to be sanctioned, which would be the case if he admitted 
coexistence between the jadal model and scriptural disputation. For him, how-
ever, these are two competing and exclusive ways of disputation. The reason he 
uses this terminology and these argumentation techniques is to prove that the 
scriptures contain them in the most perfect way. Hence the second part of his 
argument, which stated that Muslims must not have recourse to the jadal model. 20 
By defending the scriptural way of disputation, he aims to restore trust in the 
scriptures and discard the need to use the way of the theologians, let alone that 
of the philosophers. Thus, his method is clearly a process of re-traditionalization. 
Ibn al-Qayyim re-traditionalized munāẓarah by recalling early theologians and 
jurists, especially Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī (d. 935). A human being, he asserted, 
is either an inquirer, nāẓir, or a debater, munāẓir, and disputation is either praise-
worthy or blameworthy. The praiseworthy disputation is the one where a debater 
explains to other participants the guiding proof in case they look for truth; he 
silences them, or invalidates their objections. The other purpose is to incite the 
opponent to investigate the proofs of truth. If the debater neither knows the truth 
nor seeks it, it is the case of a blameworthy debate. 21 Thus, Ibn al-Qayyim tradi-
tionalizes al-Ashʿarī and al-Ghazzālī (d. 1111) to allow himself a better position in 
front of later philosophizing Ashʿari theologians. He assigns a normative func-
tion to disputation with two purposes. On the one hand, similar to a fighting 
sport, disputation should serve the orthodox faith. On the other, praiseworthy 
disputation excludes dialecticians because they neither defend scriptural truth 




19 Alina Kokoschka and Birgit Krawietz call this process appropriation; see “Appropriation of Ibn 
Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya: Challenging Expectations of Ingenuity,” in Islamic Theol-
ogy, Philosophy and Law, ed. Krawietz and Tamer, 1–33.
20 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyah, Badāʾiʿ al-fawāʾid, 1533.
21 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyah, Al-Ṣawāʿiq al-mursalah, 1274–75.
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The keyword in Ibn al-Qayyim’s conception is truth, and this should be the law 
that rules over the debaters. It is not a rational and deliberated truth, but a scrip-
tural one. Therefore, disputation is a category of calling to Islam, daʿwah. 22 He 
states that according to the status of the target, disputation is of three sorts: wis-
dom (ḥikmah), preaching (mawʿiẓah), and disputation (jidāl). If the person called 
seeks truth sincerely he should be called by wisdom, ḥikmah, and there is no need 
to use preaching or disputation with him. If he went away one should preach to 
him using enticement and intimidation, targhīb wa-tarhīb. If he is stubborn and 
disputatious, then one has to use disputation with him. In the case that disputa-
tion does not work with him, then he has to be punished. If the weapon of the 
tongue does not persuade him, he should be persuaded by the sword. This is so 
because disputation with a proponent of falsehood, mubṭil, has two benefits. On 
the one side, it could turn him from his falsehood to truth. On the other, it should 
stop his evil and enmity so that people would see that he is false. 23 
Ibn al-Qayyim plainly turns disputation into a fighting sport in the way of tra-
ditions. To delegitimize the competing model of disputation of later theologians 
and philosophers, he readjusts Sunni materials to include al-Ashʿarī and tradi-
tional Ashʿaris, such as Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī (d. 1083), who weigh heavy in the 
history of jadal, as well as al-Ghazzālī, critical as he was of dialectics. A passage 
in Ibn al-Qayyim’s Al-Ṣawāʿiq al-mursalah illustrates well his reasoning. The salaf 
did not reject kalām for using a specific terminology or following certain tech-
niques of argumentation. Actually, they argued, speculated, and disputed with 
others. They did so, however, with an aim to reach the divine and to understand 
His speech. They would observe the signs of God and extract rational proofs from 
them making reason and revelation coalesce. 24 Disputation of theologians and 
philosophers should not oppose revelation because it produces only objections, 
but not knowledge and guidance. 25 Inherent to this argument is a fideistic and 
spiritualist concept of knowledge, in the manner of al-Ghazzālī. Ultimately, jadal 
does not produce certainty and that is sufficient to discard it.
2. Practice
Ibn al-Qayyim related ten debates in which he was involved. Sometimes he pro-
vides details such as the place, the identity of the adversary, and the outcome 
of the debate. On occasion, the debate serves as an alibi to long critical discus-
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imaginary objects contest with one another, such as the sky and the earth or 
the heart and the eye. Thus, he is quite familiar with this flourishing genre of 
Mamluk literature. 26 He is also aware of the didactic use of the virtual debate in 
order to explain issues on which there are different positions. In the following, I 





IQ vs. a Jewish scholar Muḥammad’s prophethood Theology Hidāyat al-ḥayārá
27








IQ vs. a Christian scholar30 Muḥammad’s prophethood Theology
Al-Ṣawāʿiq al-
mursalah31





Theology Badāʾiʿ  al-fawāʾid32
IQ vs. a later Ashʿari The speech of God Theology
Al-Ṣawāʿiq al-
mursalah33
26 Thomas Bauer depicts concisely and accurately the literary environment of Mamluk literature 
in “Mamluk Literature: Misunderstandings and New Approaches,” MSR 9 (2005): 105–32. How-
ever, However, his article does not cover the genre of munāẓarah and its particular importance 
in Mamluk Arabic literature.
27 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyah, Hidāyat al-ḥayārá fī ajwibat al-yahūd wa-al-naṣārá, ed. ʿ Uthmān Jumʿah 
Ḍumayrīyah (Mecca, 2008/2009), 200–2.
28 Ibid., 39 and 272.
29 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyah, Al-Tibyān fī aymān al-Qurʾān, ed. ʿAbd Allāh ibn Sālim al-Baṭāṭi ̄(Mec-
ca, 2008/2009), 270–74.
30 For aspects of Ibn al-Qayyim’s apologetic against Christians and Jews, see Jon Hoover, “The 
Apologetic and Pastoral Intentions of Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya’s Polemic against Jews and Chris-
tians,” The Muslim World 100 (2010): 476–89.
31 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyah, Al-Ṣawāʿiq al-mursalah, 327.
32 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyah, Badāʾiʿ al-fawāʾid, 1606–7.
33 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyah, Al-Ṣawāʿiq al-mursalah, 1037.
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IQ vs. a determinist (like-
ly to be a later Ashʿari)34 Determinism Theology Shifāʾ al-ʿ alīl
35
IQ vs. a proponent of 
free will (likely to be a 
Muʿtazili)
Free will Theology Shifāʾ al-ʿ alīl36
IQ vs. a proponent of 
taqlīd (likely to be a 
Shafiʿi-Ashʿari adversary)
Following the 






IQ vs. a proponent of 
taqlīd Taqlīd
Theology 
and law Madārij al-sālikīn
38
IQ vs. a proponent of the 
impurity of sperm
Whether the 
sperm is pure or 
not
Law Badāʾiʿ  al-fawāʾid39
 34 35 36 37 38 39
2.1 External Evaluation
A first look at these debates shows the importance of theology (including interre-
ligious debates) for Ibn al-Qayyim. The tone of these debates is harsh, categorical, 
and Manichaeist. If munāẓarah is daʿwah, then it should be primarily with non-
Muslims or with heretics. Practice shows then that Ibn al-Qayyim seriously takes 
disputation as a fighting sport. Truth here is either with them or with his book 
(the Quran) and either with rationalism or traditionalism. 
Ibn al-Qayyim seems to have some trouble with his memory. He narrates the 
same debate on Muḥammad’s prophethood in his Zād al-maāʿd (an earlier work) 
as if it were with a Christian Scholar, then in Hidāyat al-ḥayārá, the opponent is 
a Jewish scholar. At the end of this debate, he promises his reader to write a book 
34 Livnat Holtzman thoroughly analyzed this debate in “Debating the Doctrine of jabr (Compul-
sion): Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya Reads Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī,” in Islamic Theology, Philosophy and 
Law, ed. Krawietz and Tamer, 61–93.
35 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyah, Shifāʾ al-ʿ alīl fī masāʾil al-qaḍāʾ wa-al-qadar wa-al-ḥikmah wa-al-taʿlīl, 
ed. al-Ḥassāni ̄Ḥasan ʿAbd Allāh (Cairo, 1975), 285–306.
36 Ibid., 307–57.
37 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyah, Aʿlām al-muwaqqiʿīn ʿan rabb al-ʿālamīn, ed. Mashhūr ibn Ḥasan Āl 
Salmān (al-Dammām, 2002/2003), 3:470, 4:36.
38 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyah, Madārij al-sālikīn bayna manāzil iyyāka naʿbudu wa-iyyāka nastaʿīn, 
ed. Muḥammad Ḥāmid al-Fiqi ̄(Beirut, 1973), 2:388.
39 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyah, Badāʾiʿ al-fawāʾid, 1040–52.
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about the proofs of Muḥammad’s prophecy (which is most probably his Hidāyat 
al-ḥayārá).  40 
Later Ashʿarism caused more theological concerns for Ibn al-Qayyim. The 
Ashʿari-Hanbali rivalry is at work in Ibn al-Qayyim’s disputation (as it was in 
Ibn Taymīyah’s writings). By making the apology of traditionalist theology, he 
puts philosophizing Ashʿaris in the axis of evil. Yet, the war he fought against 
Ashʿarism was literary; it compensates for inferiority in front of the overwhelm-
ingly dominant position that Ashʿarism occupied in the Sunni world through 
long debates. 
Taqlīd is an important issue represented by two debates. For this particular 
issue, Ibn al-Qayyim uses disputation as a literary device to refute his adversar-
ies. The length of the debates and their comprehensiveness indicate the weight of 
the question in his time. Ibn al-Qayyim means by taqlīd imitation of later jurists, 
theologians, and Sufi masters instead of traditions. That is to say, Ibn al-Qayyim 
stands against opposing living authorities to the traditions of salaf. Ibn al-Qayy-
im’s re-traditionalization, contrary to taqlīd, substitutes living authorities with 
past authorities who should be followed because religion was revealed to them. 
Therefore, they should be the perfect model of understanding and knowledge. 
Ibn al-Qayyim is at his best when it comes to taqlīd. He combines his outstand-
ing mastery of hadith literature and fiqh to give the impression that he attempts 
to revive Islamic law (a misunderstanding of contemporary readings). His core 
thesis is that, if you are going to follow someone, you should follow “the banners 
of those who undersign on behalf of God” (hence the title of his book, Aʿlām al-
muwaqqiʿ īn ʿan rabb al-ʿālamīn).
Here, law is insignificant. It might even be said that he considers the juridical 
dialectics of al-ʿAmīdī’s an evil. If that is the case, it is surprising that juridical 
debates do not have a fair share in his practice. In fact, the reason behind his criti-
cism of al-ʿAmīdī is that the latter rationalized juridical dialectics, transforming 
jadal into an art of disputation with no room for traditions.
Ibn al-Qayyim does not mention any internal Hanbali debate, since if he wish-
es to mobilize forces for his war of ideas, there should be no discord inside the 
Hanbali school, which he perceived as the vanguard of traditionalism. Moreover, 
here, Ibn al-Qayyim seems to be almost completely forsaking Ibn Taymīyah’s 
mantle, claiming pride and skill in argumentation. It is him against the others 
(although he still adheres to Ibn Taymīyah’s project). At the thematic level, he 
also differs from Ibn Taymīyah who was keener on the theological issues of di-
vine attributes.
40 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyah, Zād al-maʿād fī hady khayr al-ʿ ibād, ed. Shuʿayb al-Arnāūṭ and ʿAbd al-
Qādir al-Arnāūṭ (Beirut, 1998), 3:559–61.
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2.2 Internal Evaluation
Unsurprisingly, Ibn al-Qayyim does not use logic to support his claims. His argu-
ment with non-Muslims is based on sophistry. A recurrent device is the argument 
from silence (argumentum e silentio)—where the final proof is the silence of the 
opponent, failing to counter argue, thus admitting defeat. Ibn al-Qayyim ends 
the debate saying that his opponent is unable to speak. In his debate with the 
Jewish scholar he uses retrospective determinism to maintain that Muḥammad’s 
prophethood was God’s destiny. Since the victory of Muḥammad indeed occurred, 
it must have been inevitable and wanted by God. Otherwise, God would not have 
allowed it. He therefore infers from something that happened that something 
is good. With his Christian counterpart, he uses an argumentum ad populum: 
namely that most people in the east are Muslims, therefore Islam is true and 
Christianity is false. Finally, against the Samaritans he uses a proof of alteration, 
taḥrīf, since they changed the Jewish direction of prayer, qiblah, which was the 
original one.
As for his debates with Muslims, Ibn al-Qayyim frequently uses three proce-
dures. First is a shotgun argumentation, in which he mobilizes dozens of “proofs” 
(which he calls wujūh) to support his position with the hope that the appeal to this 
quantity of arguments would destroy his opponent’s position or push him into si-
lence. Also, he relies on transmitted proofs—arguments from authority—because 
appeal to traditions effectively persuades a Muslim audience. Besides, it confirms 
his belief in the superiority of scriptural argumentation. He fully exploits tradi-
tions and the Companions’ opinions to compete with his rationalist opponents, 
being able as he is to endlessly quote traditions, far beyond Ibn Taymīyah’s ca-
pacity. As a result, Ibn al-Qayyim’s argument often turns into a compilation of 
traditions, digressions, and redundancy. Third, Ibn al-Qayyim employs the art of 
contradiction making, ilzām, a classic of kalām, based on argument ad absurdum. 41 
For instance, in the issue of taqlīd he often argues that a muqallid should not en-
gage in a debate because this undermines the very basis of his position, taqlīd. 
This is a contradiction which, in the final analysis, shows the absurdity of taqlīd.
Conclusion
The internal assessment of Ibn al-Qayyim’s disputation shows his reliance on 
theological dialectics, especially on rhetorical devices and contradiction-making. 
Classical theologians and jurists such as al-Ashʿarī and Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī prac-
ticed these techniques and compiled them. These are the weapons Ibn al-Qayyim 
41 On this procedure, see Richard M. Frank, “The Kalâm, an Art of Contradiction-Making or Theo-
logical Science? Some Remarks on the Question,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 88 
(1968): 295–309.
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uses against the syllogistics of later theologians such as al-Rāzī and al-Ṭūsī. Obvi-
ously, al-Ashʿarī and al-Shīrāzī do not belong to the salaf, but they are traditional-
ist or semi-traditionalist scholars. In Ibn al-Qayyim’s view, their method should 
be free of logic and philosophy and closer to the method of salaf.
The struggle Ibn al-Qayyim engages in against non-Muslims and later Ashʿaris 
is as valid as jihād. Ibn al-Qayyim’s disputation does not take part in the “hu-
manist” characteristics of disputation that flourished in Abbasid literary councils 
such as empathy, cooperative ethics of inquiry, and belief in reason. He constant-
ly reminds his reader that the tongue should strive as much as the sword against 
opponents. His disputation is martial and exclusivist. Armed with his enthusiasm 
and belief in traditionalism, he fought against the dialectics of the philosophiz-
ing theologians. In his disputation, Ibn al-Qayyim appears as a traditionalist who 
attacks on all fronts to restore the imagined community of early Muslims. He ap-
peals to the past, which is supposed to represent a perfect model of reasoning and 
believing on the basis of transmitted traditions. 
Thus, there is no case for claiming as Langermann did that Ibn al-Qayyim 
naturalizes science. Ibn al-Qayyim perceived logic as the enemy, and especially 
in the hands of later theologians, as it meant the end of traditionalism. In his 
view, the weapon itself, logic (or science in general), should be opposed with a 
traditionalist weapon (made by early or classical Sunni scholars). For this reason, 
it is appropriate to call his enterprise re-traditionalization and de-naturalization 
of science. It is an apology of traditionalism: Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal in the coat of 
al-Ashʿarī.
